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Liberalism, culture, and autonomy : a study on rights

Author: Howard Michael Lintz; University of North Carolina at Charlotte. Department of Philosophy.; University of North Carolina at Charlotte. Dept. of Philosophy.
Publisher: ©2010.
Dissertation: M.A. University of North Carolina at Charlotte 2010
Edition/Format:   Thesis/dissertation : Thesis/dissertation : Manuscript   Archival Material : English
Database:WorldCat
Summary:
I review three theories of political rights. The first, constructed by John Rawls, conceives of political justice as a particular type of equity and emphasizes the elimination of what Rawls sees as arbitrary influences, including such personal features as race, cultural background, and gender. That view has been exceptionally influential: A great number of liberals take it as their starting point, and many thinkers,  Read more...
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Material Type: Thesis/dissertation, Manuscript
Document Type: Book, Archival Material
All Authors / Contributors: Howard Michael Lintz; University of North Carolina at Charlotte. Department of Philosophy.; University of North Carolina at Charlotte. Dept. of Philosophy.
OCLC Number: 841574592
Notes: UNC Charlotte Libraries notes:
I review three theories of political rights. The first, constructed by John Rawls, conceives of political justice as a particular type of equity and emphasizes the elimination of what Rawls sees as arbitrary influences, including such personal features as race, cultural background, and gender. That view has been exceptionally influential: A great number of liberals take it as their starting point, and many thinkers, ranging across the political spectrum, have specially targeted it for objection. If there is a paradigmatic view within contemporary liberal theory, it is Rawls's.Will Kymlicka's theory is the second considered here. It is intended to build on Rawls's work, but differs importantly in allowing different rights to citizens according to their cultural communities; Kymlicka thinks this differentiation is the essence of liberal equality.The third theory considered is that offered by Chandran Kukathas. His stance is that the state is not the sole or ultimate arbiter of rights, that persons ought to be allowed to live as they see fit, and that they should be free to surrender their rights and themselves to whatever associations they wish. He thinks respect for individuals' choices of how to live is the essence of liberalism.I disagree with Kymlicka and Kukathas. In this paper, I describe a number of problems with both theories. Finally, I argue that, even by their own standards of liberalism, both Kymlicka and Kukathas build theories less liberal than Rawls's. They therefore fail not only to meet external standards, but also to provide internal consistency.
Thesis (M.A.)--University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 2010.
JT
Description: 69 leaves : illustrations ; 29 cm
Responsibility: by Howard Michael Lintz.
Local System Bib Number:
.b27651721

Abstract:

I review three theories of political rights. The first, constructed by John Rawls, conceives of political justice as a particular type of equity and emphasizes the elimination of what Rawls sees as arbitrary influences, including such personal features as race, cultural background, and gender. That view has been exceptionally influential: A great number of liberals take it as their starting point, and many thinkers, ranging across the political spectrum, have specially targeted it for objection. If there is a paradigmatic view within contemporary liberal theory, it is Rawls's. Will Kymlicka's theory is the second considered here. It is intended to build on Rawls's work, but differs importantly in allowing different rights to citizens according to their cultural communities; Kymlicka thinks this differentiation is the essence of liberal equality. The third theory considered is that offered by Chandran Kukathas. His stance is that the state is not the sole or ultimate arbiter of rights, that persons ought to be allowed to live as they see fit, and that they should be free to surrender their rights and themselves to whatever associations they wish. He thinks respect for individuals' choices of how to live is the essence of liberalism. I disagree with Kymlicka and Kukathas. In this paper, I describe a number of problems with both theories. Finally, I argue that, even by their own standards of liberalism, both Kymlicka and Kukathas build theories less liberal than Rawls's. They therefore fail not only to meet external standards, but also to provide internal consistency.
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